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 Climate change has drastically changed the prospects of obtaining resources in the 
Arctic that where long deemed unobtainable due to the harsh climate in the region. The 
European Union has gradually evolved its Arctic policy in recent years due to these 
severe alterations, in which the European Commission has been the most active in 
pursuing that policy. This thesis analysed the gradual change in perception that the 
European Commission had on Arctic governance, security and commercial interests. In 
order to assess this change in perception, the theories of Liberalism and Realism were 
operationalised together with a dimensional model type analysis. The material that was 
analysed in this thesis were the three main European Arctic policy documents released 
in 2008, 2012 and 2016. The contents of the policies where analysed according to the 
model types, Realism and Liberalism, and subsequently placed on a dimensional scale 
in order to determine the gradual change. The results indicate that there has been a 
gradual change in perception of Arctic security and commercial interests, but not when 
it concerns regional governance. The European Commission, according to its Arctic 
policy, perceives Arctic affairs both according to realism and liberalism depending on 
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Initially, a major reason for the increased broad EU interest in Arctic affairs was the result of 
an international discourse on the geopolitical implications of climate change in the region, 
which has increased from 2007 and onwards. Global climate change has placed the Arctic 
region1 at the centre of geopolitics as the melting ice sheet transforms the Arctic from a region 
with predominantly scientific interest, to one with commercial, national security and 
environmental concerns. This has subsequently led to severe effects on the international 
political system. Longer ice-free periods will have profound commercial implications for the 
Arctic as it is estimated that 90 billion barrels of oil and 44 billion barrels of natural gas are 
located in the region. Furthermore, the northern sea route would shorten maritime transport 
between Asia and Europe by 40%, compared to the existing routes through the Suez and 
Panama canals.2 
Endorsed by the European Commission, concerns over the implications of climate change led 
to the first Arctic policy developed by the European Union in 2008. In turn, the European 
Commission has expanded the foreign policy of the European Union by working as a 
“supranational entrepreneur”, and it has been vital in developing the Arctic Policy of the 
European Union.3 Furthermore, the contents of the policy have over the years switched course 
from concerns over the geopolitical implications of climate change, to more softer issues in 
order to gain legitimacy in the region.4  Additionally, when the EU acts as an Arctic actor, it is 
grounded on values such as  liberty and peace, which in turn forms the political structure known 
as “Normative Power Europe”. This implies that the EU wants to act as a “force for good”, 
rather than adhering to realistic interests in the Arctic.5 However, the main reason for increased 
EU interest in the Arctic is arguably due to economic factors, as well as environmental and 
political ones. These interests constitute the will to protect the rights of indigenous peoples in 
 
1 See Appendix 1. 
2 Ebinger, K., Charles & Zambetakis, Evie., (2009) “The Geopolitics of Arctic melt” International Affairs, Vol 
85(6) p. 1215-1216  
3 Offerdal, Kristine (2011) “The EU in the Arctic: In pursuit of legitimacy and influence.” International Journal, 
Vol 66(4), p. 864 
4 Offerdal (2011) p. 862 




the region, as well as safeguarding the flow and existence of Arctic natural resources such as 
fish, oil and natural gas of which the EU is highly dependent on.6  
The stability of the Arctic region relies on two main factors. The policies of the respective 
Arctic nations and their ability to solve any disputes with each other through regional and 
international institutions such as the Arctic council and the United Nations, alongside 
international law. Moreover, the stability of the region is also mainly connected to the 
enviroment, which in turn is connected with geopolitical stability.7  The arctic melt will not 
lead to a “race for the Arctic” as long as the technological capabilities that are necessary for 
harnessing resources confined in the region are lacking. However, when existent, it could lead 
to severe economic, military, governmental and environmental challenges for the region. As 
such, there is no reason to believe that the region will function alongside international law and 
existing cooperative institutions, and the same can be said about the European union’s 
multilateral approach.8  
On the 20th of July 2020, the European Commission and the External Action Service issued a 
press release concerning an invitation for a public consultation on the future structure of EU 
Arctic Policy. In which high representative Joseph Borrell stated:  
The Arctic is a rapidly evolving frontier in international relations. Climate change is dramatically 
transforming the region, and increasing its geopolitical importance, with a number of players seeing 
new strategic and economic opportunities in the High North. We must ensure that the Arctic remains 
a zone of low tension and peaceful cooperation, where issues are solved through constructive 
dialogue. The European Union must be fully equipped to manage the new dynamics effectively, in 
line with our interests and values.9 
1.1. Statement of problem 
The words expressed by high representative Joseph Borrell implies that the European 
Commission yet again acknowledges the geopolitical importance of the Arctic, and thus it 
presents evidence that the EU might leave a softer approach for a harder one yet again. The EU 
had a “harder” approach in its first Arctic policy but left it for a softer one in order to satisfy 
 
6 Hossain, Kamrul (2015)” EU Engagement in the Arctic: Do the Policy Responses from the Arctic States 
Recognise the EU as a Legitimate Stakeholder?” Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 6, p. 94 
7 Heininen, Lassi (2012)” State of the Arctic Strategies and Policies – A summary” Arctic yearbook, p. 42-43 
8 Ebinger & Zambetakis (2009) p. 1231 




Arctic Council members. Likewise, the notion of cooperation in the Arctic will change as the 
climate deteriorates further, although the EU wants to act as a “force of good” rather than 
adhering to “realist interests”. Yet, a reason for increased EU interest in the Arctic is due to the 
natural resources that are confined there, which arguably adheres to a realist stance. As the 
Arctic Region is ever changing and with the background the words expressed by high 
representative Joseph Borrell in the 2020 communication, the purpose of this thesis is to answer 
the following question: 
Does the European Commission’s perception of the Arctic predominantly correspond 
with Realism or Liberalism and in what way has that perception gradually changed? 
1.2. Aim 
Previous research mainly focusses on the legal competences, motives and alignment of EU 
policy with other Arctic nations, as well as its early development. Thus, the principal aim of 
this thesis is to addresses the lack of research on the gradual change of the European 
Commission’s perception of the Arctic with reference to the theories of Liberalism and Realism. 
By virtue of this, a research gap has been identified.10  
The question of Arctic transformation will not only have severe environmental repercussions 
for Europe, but perhaps for the entire world as well. The increasing water temperatures have 
grave impacts on local, and adjacent flora and fauna. In the beginning of autumn in 2009, nearly 
3,500 walruses assembled on the Alaskan north west coast as a result of reduced sea ice. Polar 
bears face extinction in less the 70 years due to melting sea-ice.11 During the cold war, the arctic 
was a region of great strategic interest for the United States and the Soviet Union. The military 
escalation in the area was so severe that Mikhail Gorbachev, the last soviet president spoke of 
the necessity to keep the arctic region as “low tension, high north”.12 In the 21st century, as of 
yet, the interests are mainly economic and surrounds the extraction of local resources that where 
long deemed unobtainable, but as the Norwegian foreign minister stated in 2005, “In the future, 
the High North will be one of the most important strategic areas in the world.”13 
 
10 Esaiasson, P., Gilljam, M., Oscarsson, H., Towns, A., & Wängnerud, L. (2017). 
Metodpraktikan: konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. (4., [rev.] uppl.). p. 32 
11 Ebinger & Zambetakis (2009) p. 1215 
12 Lanteigne, Marc (2019, 28th June) 
13 Tamnes, Rolf., & Offerdal, Kristine (ED.) (2014) Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic, Regional dynamics in 




2. Previous research 
2.1. The European Union in the Arctic 
Kiovurova et. Al. evaluates the legal competences of the EU in the arctic region and concludes 
that the EU has strong legal competences to affect the Arctic Region as a whole, although 
membership in the Arctic council not necessarily is the most relevant option for the EU in terms 
of Arctic governance.  In turn, the legal competences of the EU will only increase in scope and 
reach as the sea ice in the Arctic recedes. Despite its lack of a permanent observer role status in 
the Arctic council, direct shoreline and territorial assets, the EU should be seen as an important 
Arctic actor. Moreover Kiovuroa et al. reckons that the legal competences of the EU should be 
distinguished from its member states as many of EU policy areas are already firmly regulated 
at a supranational level and will continue to be so.14  
Kamrul Hossain also examines whether the EU is a legitimate stakeholder in the Arctic by 
evaluating the policy responses of Arctic states in order to establish if these are plausible 
indicators for the EUs success in becoming a legitimate actor. Hossain maintains that even if 
the Arctic states do not recognise the EU as a legitimate stakeholder in the Arctic as a result of 
non-existing regional presence. They do not deny the European Union’s importance, and they 
do not perceive it as inferior, compared to those that possess an observer status in the Arctic 
council. Moreover, he argues that despite the lack of a permanent observer status in the Arctic 
Council, the EU possesses legitimate rights due to international law as well as through 
engagement in regional affairs which implies that it constitutes a relevant powerful actor in the 
region.15 
Kiovura et. Al. argues that the mistake many Arctic actors make; is the notion that individual 
states are the pivotal actors in Arctic governance, which according to them is increasingly not 
the case, as the principal decision-making process in terms of its member-states is taking place 
in EU institutions, increasingly in the hands of foremost the European Commission.16  
Hossain maintains that the main reasons for the EUs increasing interest in the Arctic region is 
due to economic, environmental and political factors. The political factors constitute the 
protection of the indigenous peoples of the Artic, whilst the environmental and economic 
 
14 Koivurova et. Al. (2011) p. 361, 369 
15 Hossain (2015) p. 92, 104 




intertwine as the EU is highly dependent on fish, gas, oil and other natural resources in the 
region.17 
Østhagen argues that in order to understand the EU as a foreign policy actor, the theory of 
“Normative power Europe” has to be applied. Thus, when the EU acts as an Arctic power, the 
political structure of the EU implies that it acts in a normative fashion. He also argues that the 
EU want to engage in foreign policy “as a force for good”, rather than following realist interest. 
Furthermore, The EUs intuitional setup for foreign policy relies on unanimity amongst its 
member states and as a result it is perceived as weak international player as it lacks means for 
enforcing policies.18 
Kristine Offerdal tries to understand what role the European Union seeks in its Arctic policy 
and if it in turn challenges existing interests of Arctic states, with an emphasis on Norway-EU 
relations. She does this in order to evaluate the prospects of the EU becoming a major Arctic 
actor and to understand whether the region is becoming more including for non-arctic actors, 
or if it will continue to be dominated by the inner circle of the Arctic council. Offerdal states 
that her analysis is based on the notion that policy is event driven and that The European 
Union’s Arctic policy derives from the Russian flag planting in 2007. Offerdal furthermore 
argues that the factors that motivate and affect EU Arctic policy is a small number of 
stakeholders at state, institutional and individual levels, Arctic events and international events, 
as well as EU policy areas with adjacent Arctic policy implications.19  
Offerdal explains that since the inception of an EU Arctic policy in 2007, the policy has altered 
its course from the security implications of climate change, to focusing on how the EU can gain 
legitimacy as an Arctic actor, which according to her has become the pivotal goal of the EU. 
However, the Arctic is not opening up to new actors, despite the evidence portraying otherwise. 
Regardless of Norway’s cooperative relations with the EU, due to a harder relationship with 
Russia and Canada, and as of their reluctance to cede the Union a permanent observer status in 
the Arctic council. This leads to the fact that gaining a permanent observer role will not be an 
easy task.20  Østhagen argues that the lack of clarity and the complex internal decision-making 
process resulted in the questioning of its legitimacy by other Arctic nations. This together with 
 
17 Hossain (2015) p. 93–94 
18 Østhagen (2013) p. 73 
19 Offerdal (2011) p. 862 




the seal ban issue resulted in that the EU could not gain a permanent observer status in the AC, 
and ultimately in the development of an EU Arctic policy at large as it has not convinced other 
Arctic Council members of its more moderated approach.21  
In turn, Østhagen scrutinises the role of the European Union in the Arctic by establishing, why, 
how and to what end the European Union seek to become an Arctic actor.  Østhagen identifies 
economic aspects by virtue of the eventual use of the north east and north west passage for 
maritime traffic. In relation to that 90% of all EU external trade is done by sea, and that 40% 
of the worlds shipping fleet sails under EU flag. He likewise identifies EU reliance on Arctic 
fish stock.22 These in turn, circumscribe three major dimensions; its geographic proximity, 
policy linkages (such as bilateral agreements concerning fish stock with Arctic nations), as well 
as the interests of the EU institutions. In which the Commission and the EEAS has been the 
most active in pursuing an Arctic policy with emphasis on sustainable policy. In turn, the 
institutional setup constitutes the “how”, the EU is developing its Arctic policy. 23 
2.2. The Arctic region in the 21st century 
Lassi Heininen examines the Arctic strategies of all Arctic states in order to identify similarities 
and differences between their different regional policies. He argues that the newly developed 
national Arctic state policies manifest the growing importance of the Arctic region and their 
northern parts respectively. He concludes that there is a clear growing interest in the region that 
has not found the same level of interest since the end of the cold war, as since the end of the 
1990s, only Canada and Norway had a functioning arctic strategy.24  The newly produced 
strategies by arctic and non-arctic states give evidence of a changing Arctic region and an 
increased interest amongst global and international actors towards the Arctic as well as the 
northern hemisphere. Heininen additionally determines that the current stability and peaceful 
cooperation of the Arctic Region circumscribes and relies on the policies of the respective 
nations. He also maintains that regional and international intuitions like the Arctic Council with 
its permanent members, and the United Nations UNCLOS also enables its adjacent nations to 
solve territorial disputes alongside international law. He does however realize that the position 
of the Arctic nations is changing and as such, so is also the idea of cooperation in the region as 
 
21 Østhagen (2013) p. 80–81 
22 Østhagen (2013) p. 74–75 
23 Østhagen (2013) p. 86 




a result of a significant and rapid environmental, geo-economic and geopolitical change. As a 
result of this rapid change, the nations in the Arctic are more interested in exploiting the vast 
natural resources and to secure their strategic sovereignty over existing boundaries and 
maritime lanes. He argues that this can in turn be seen with the more prevalent and enhanced 
policies of the respective nations that elaborates their policies with national objectives and 
priority areas as they all want a firmer influence in regional affairs.25 
In a second article by Heininen, he portrays the post-cold war Arctic order and discusses what 
might be the special features of the region as a result of globalisation.26 According to Heininen, 
the Arctic plays a key role in the global ecosystem, which due to its heavy impact on climate 
change, has made environmental protection a key concern amongst non-arctic, and Arctic 
actors. Climate change constituted a paradigm shift which resulted in the first field of functional 
cooperation amongst the eight Arctic states in the AC. Unlike during the cold war, the 
institutional stability of the AC has resulted in a high geopolitical stability free from military 
conflict. Despite stiffer relations between Russia and the west in recent years Heininen argues 
that Arctic stability has been exceptional.27 This implies that the geopolitical stability of the 
Arctic is resilient. However, he concludes that the stability of the region is connected with the 
environment, which in turn is connected with geopolitical security. 
In turn, Ebinger & Zambetakis argues that the arctic melt will result in economic, military, 
governmental and environmental challenges to the Arctic region. However, as long as the 
technological aspect of harnessing the resources is lacking, it is unlikely that a “race to the 
arctic” will occur. In other words, global climate change has placed the Arctic into the centre 
of geopolitics as of the region’s likely transformation from a mainly scientific interest area to 
an area with commercial, security and environmental interests. Thus, having severe 
implications for the existing legal and political system that govern the area and its adjacent 
territories.28   
Ebinger & Zambetakis affirms that despite that the present Arctic region functions alongside 
the boundaries confined in the international, regional legal and political system, namely the 
 
25 Heininen (2012) p. 43 
26 Heininen, Lassi (2018) “Arctic Geopolitics from classical to critical approach – importance of immaterial 
factors.” Geography, Enviroment, Sustainability, Vol. 11(1) p. 172 
27 Heininen (2018) p. 181 




UNCLOS, Artic council and other bilateral agreements. There is no reason to believe that this 
spirit of cooperation will continue in the future. They concur that the same can be said about 
the EU: s present multilateral approach to Arctic governance.29 The overall uncertainty aligns 
with five factors that as they change, will subsequently change how the region functions along 
the notion of multilateral cooperation. These constitute rising oil prices, ice-capable technology, 
that the Arctic community must be convinced that any extraction of resources will not result in 
the degradation of the Arctic enviroment, increased interest in the maritime shipping routes in 
the region and heightened commercial interests which in turn creates a favourable investment 
enviroment.30 
 
29 Ebinger & Zambetakis (2009) p. 1231 






Realism and Liberalism are the two main theories of international politics and they can arguably 
be characterised along the lines of cooperation (liberalism) and confrontation (realism). Most 
of the great intellectual battles among scholars of international relations take place within or 
across these two theories.31 Liberalism is founded on the moral argument that an individual has 
the right to live a life in freedom, own property, and have access to free and fair elections. A 
political system that has unchecked power over its citizens limits these key notions and as a 
result, the key objective in liberal theory is to create institutions and states that can limit power 
over others.32 There are three core paradigms in Liberalism. Namely, that states are the main 
actors in international politics, secondly, that the internal structure of the state affect its 
behaviour and finally, liberals believe in the notion that power is not relevant in calculating or 
explaining the behaviour of states, as in an ideal world, power is irrelevant.33 
Liberal theorists believe that the internal arrangement of states (mainly democracy vs 
dictatorship) is preferable, as such there is a good and bad in international politics. Good states 
pursue cooperative policies instead of waging war. In direct opposition to “bad states” that 
create and cause conflict through force. As such, the key to world peace is to create as many 
“good” democratic states as possible. This theory stems from the democratic peace theory 
which claims that democratic states are less inclined to wage war against each other. In other 
words, more democratic states, more cooperation, less war and conflict.34 
Liberal theory also argues that a high level of economic interdependence among states makes 
them less likely to wage conflict against each other. The economic interdependence stems from 
the creation and maintenance of a liberal economic order, that is to say free trade and economic 
exchange. Such an order it is argued, generate more prosperous states. More prosperous states 
bolster peace as they are satisfied and do not possess the inclination to wage conflict against 
others. Moreover, war is often waged in order to gain wealth but if states are connected with 
 
31 Mearsheimer, John., J. (2014) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Updated Edition. New York: Norton 
paperback. p. 14 
32 McGlinchey, Stephen., Walters, Rosie. & Scheinpflug, Christian (2017) International Relations Theory. 
Bristol: E-International relations publishing. P. 22 
33 Mearsheimer (2014) p. 15–16 




each other they are less likely to fight one another as it would damage the economy. Such an 
order makes states focus on accumulating wealth by trade, instead of war.35 
The final cornerstone of liberalism focuses on the maintenance and creation of international 
institutions. These in turn, enhance the prospects of cooperation amongst states and as a result, 
leads to a reduction in the likelihood of war. However, the institutions are not political entities 
with legislative power over nation states. Instead, they function as “guides” in the international 
political system by working through a set of rules that stipulate how states should act in the 
system. The institutions are in turn created by states that form the rules that prohibit or 
encourage certain edicts and as a result it is in a state’s best interest to maintain these institutions 
in order to push states towards peace.36 
3.2. Realism 
Realism is the opposite of Liberalism in its notion of how international politics operate. Realist 
theory emphasises on the competitive and conflictual side of international relations, and realist 
scholars believe in the notion that the nation-state is the principal actor in international politics. 
Realists do recognize others such as organisations and powerful individuals, but they believe 
that their power is limited compared to that of states. The state in turn, functions as a unitary 
actor and especially so in times of war which lead the state to act as one.37 As Kenneth Waltz 
exemplifies concerning the anarchic structure of the world: 
With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging 
its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire-conflict, sometimes 
leading to war, is bound to occur. To achieve a favourable outcome from such a conflict a state has 
to rely on its own devices, the relative efficiency of which must be a constant concern.38 
Realists are often considered to be pessimists compared to liberals; this is not due to the fact 
that they do not wish to create a peaceful world, but as a reason for their belief in that there is 
no escape from the great power politics of the world. The theory like Liberalism, is based on 
three core arguments. As previously stated, realists believe that the nation state is the principal 
actor in world politics, but it mainly focuses on the great powers of international politics as they 
 
35 Mearsheimer (2014) p. 16 
36 Mearsheimer (2014) p. 17 
37 McGlinchey et. Al. (2017) p. 15 




are the ones that shape the world and thus, creates the deadliest wars. This forms the first 
paradigm of Realist theory.39  
Secondly, realists believe in the notion that the behaviour of those powerful states is a reflection 
of their external enviroment, and not determined by internal structures. In other words, the 
international political system shapes foreign policy. Unlike liberal theorists, realists do not draw 
any distinctions between “good” or “bad” states as they believe that all great powers act the 
same, regardless of their political structure or culture, as they all seek to retrieve more power. 
As such, the only discrimination between states is that of great and relative world powers.40 
The final paradigm denotes in the belief that states calculate power and as such, this determines 
how they think and perhaps more importantly, act. This emancipates in a belief that this creates 
a power struggle between states which sometimes lead to war, which is considered an 
acceptable instrument of statecraft. Even if states do cooperate, they do so because of an 
underlying power struggle and conflicting interests in the greater balance of power.41 
3.3. Problematisation of Theoretical concepts  
Previous research state that EU foreign policy is founded on the notion of being a normative 
power.42 That is to say being founded on a series of declarations, policies and treaties that follow 
five core rules. These are the rule of law, peace, liberty, democracy and human rights.43 This in 
turn affects how the EU acts as a global actor and the subsequent objectives that are confined 
in its foreign policy. In other words, it “forces” the European Union to act “as a force of good” 
rather than adhering to realist interests.44 Consequently, when the EU approaches the Arctic 
region, previous research state that it does so as a normative power. This implies that the 
European Union is deeply influenced by Liberal theory. 
Concerning the Arctic, and foreign policy claiming to follow the notion of Liberal democracy, 
is more problematic than what it seems. This implies that there is a difference from political 
rhetoric and practise. The United states portrays itself as being a nation that spreads Liberal 
 
39 Mearsheimer (2014) p.17 
40 Mearsheimer (2014) p. 18 
41 Mearsheimer (2014) p. 18 
42 Østhagen (2013) p. 73 
43 Skripnikova (2018) p. 18 




democracy through its foreign policy, but arguably American foreign policy has traditionally 
been guided by the language of power and realist logic.45  
The European Union also asserts to follow the notion of “liberal democracy” in its foreign 
policy by adhering to a normative foundation. However, realist foreign policy is based on the 
notion that there is a constant struggle for a scarce number of resources. In turn, these resources 
can be anything from trading rights to agricultural land, and as such they are economic interests. 
As Kenneth Waltz observes, "economic and technological competition is often as keen as 
military competition."46 This makes the notion that the EU is a normative actor in the Arctic 
problematic, as previous research claim that the EU has economic interests in the arctic region 
that stems from the resources contained there.47 Previous research also claim that initial EU 
concern stemmed from the geopolitical alterations of climate change,48 which implies that there 
was a fear of a power struggle in the region. EU policy can also be somewhat ambivalent due 
to the internal structure of the Union and in in foreign policy, as Kissinger puts it, “It embraces 
universal ideas without the means to enforce them”.49  
3.4. Operationalisation of Theoretical concepts 
The main research question: “Does the European Commission’s perception of the Arctic 
predominantly correspond with Realism or Liberalism and in what way has that perception 
gradually changed?”, has in accordance with the theories of Liberalism and Realism been 
operationalised into three research questions with reference to previous research and the thesis’s 
theoretical and methodological foundation. The operationalised research questions will be 
placed in an analysis table,50 which in turn constitute the analysis tool for this thesis. The 
research questions constitute the different dimensions that will be used to answer the main 
research question. Below the research questions are the operationalised model types with 
background to the previously presented theoretical foundation of this thesis. 
 
45 Mearsheimer (2014) p. 25–26. 
46 Moravkcik, Andrew., & Legro, W., Jeffrey (1999) “Is anybody still a realist?” International Security, Vol. 
24(2) p. 15-16 
47 Hossain (2015) p. 93-94 
48 Offerdal (2011) p. 875 
49 Kissinger (2015) p. 92 




1. How does the Arctic policy align itself according to the perception that the Arctic is 
characterised by multilateral or unilateral governance? 
Liberalism assumes that states are the principal actors in world politics, whilst also recognising 
other stakeholders as important in world politics. Realist theory argues that only states are the 
principal actors in world politics as they perceive other stakeholders as inferior in terms of 
power, as the political system is anarchic.51 If the European Commission perceives only states 
as the principal actors in Arctic politics in the imminent analysis, it arguably aligns itself with 
a realist dimension. If the Commission perceives states as important, but not as superior to that 
of other stakeholders it is aligned with a liberal dimension in the analysis. 
2. How does the Arctic policy align itself according to the perception that the Arctic is 
characterised by divergence or interdependence in economic interests? 
Liberal theory assumes that there is a self-regulating system based on cooperation. This 
cooperation creates interdependence amongst states in the form of free trade and economic 
exchange which in turn creates prosperous states. Prosperous states are less inclined to wage 
war against each other and as such cooperation is desirable.52 Realist theory assumes that 
cooperation is only desirable if it is profitable for the state, in other words to enhance state 
power as the worlds political system is characterised thereof. Furthermore, it assumes that there 
is a constant struggle over a scarce number of resources and thus it should seek to retrieve those 
resources.53  
As such, if the Commission perceives the economic interests in the Arctic region as a means 
for self-interest or as way increase power amongst the various Arctic stakeholders, it is more in 
accordance with Realism. If the Commission recognises that the economic interests in the 
region has equal benefits and include words such as cooperation and peace it perceives the 
Arctic region more in accordance with Liberalism. 
 
 
51 Mearsheimer (2014) p. 16, 18 
52 Mearsheimer (2014) p. 16,  




3. How does the Arctic policy objectives align itself according to the perception that 
Arctic security is defined by anarchy or the rule of law? 
Liberal theory strives for human rights, democracy and peaceful means in order to create a safe 
international political system. This is done through the maintenance or creation of an 
international system comprised of similar minded democratic states. These create a framework 
of laws maintained by states that wish to uphold them in order to reinforce peace.54 Realist 
theory assumes that the international political system is anarchic and defined by power. Thus, 
all states seek to increase their power in order to ordain themselves above other competing 
states.55 The European Commission perceives the Arctic region conferring with a realist stance 
if they recognise that there is a power struggle amongst Arctic and adjacent states over 
resources, or influence in the region. If the Commission perceives the Arctic as stable through 
the maintenance of regulation, institutions, and the rule of law, it is more in accordance with a 
liberal dimension. 
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4. Method & material  
4.1. Research method 
This thesis takes its foundation upon an idea analysis that focuses on model types. The method 
is systematic as its main purpose is to map the underlying structure of ideas confined in the 
material.56 Ideas and ideologies are present in all forms social exchange and as a result they 
affect our actions. By virtue of this, they are the archetype for political analysis as they often 
form policy or recommendations thereof. Thus, in the case with this method the concept “idea” 
should not be mistaken as cognitive thoughts. The idea analysis is suitable for examining 
ideological change in policy documents, decrees and political debate57 and as such it was 
chosen with its relevance to the main problem statement of this thesis. Namely, how the 
European Commission’s perception of the Arctic has changed over the years.   
The method enables the researcher to map and understand underlying content in the chosen 
material by placing it alongside “model types”,58 which in the case of this thesis is the political 
theories of Liberalism and Realism. The research method has no given format on how it should 
be executed and as such it gives the researcher liberty to create his own analysis tools, only the 
research question and the available material determines the analysis arrangement. The main 
objective for an idea analysist is therefore to produce a reliable account of the underlying ideas 
that generate the material. In turn, the process relies on the researcher’s ability to perform 
reductively. This implies that the researcher tests the preconditions and hypothesises repeatably 
in order to produce reliable results. Accordingly, the method puts dormant structures into the 
open by analysing it at an innate level and as consequence it provides a broader perspective. 
This is of interest of this thesis, as those structures are not evident at first glance. 
4.2. Research Material 
The secondary material that was used in this thesis is comprised of literature, previous research 
and academic journals retrieved from the Gothenburg University Library database and Google 
Scholar. The main scientific material was retrieved from eur-lex.europa.eu which is the official 
website of European Union law and policy documents. The research material that will be 
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analysed are the three main European Union Arctic policy documents endorsed by the European 
Commission, namely; 
1. (COM, 2008), 0763, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council - The European Union and the arctic region. Released in on the 20th of November 
2008. 
2. (JOIN, 2012), 029, JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND THE COUNCIL - Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: 
progress since 2008 and next steps. Released on the 26th of June 2012. 
3. (JOIN, 2016), 021, JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND THE COUNCIL - An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic. Released on the 
27th of April 2016. 
4.3. Case selection 
The reason for why the European Commission’s perception of the Arctic has been chosen for 
this thesis is threefold. The European Commission functions as the “legislative proposer” within 
the European Union, and it works as an agenda maker and policy advocate.59  Furthermore, 
previous research also explains, considering the increased political importance of the Arctic, 
that policy is overall highly dependent on rhetoric, which in turn creates policy and thus 
constructs the geopolitical importance of the Arctic region. Depending on what one chose to 
call the Arctic, the policy will in turn reflect how it is perceived.60 This implies that depending 
on how the European Commission perceives the Arctic, as will also the European Union’s 
policy reflect that perception. That perception can also present evidence of how the Arctic 
region should be understood in that moment. 
European Union Arctic policy has been gradually constructed and formed by a plethora of 
initiatives and policy documents, involving the entirety of European Union institutions. Due to 
limitations ordained for this bachelor’s thesis, the main focus will be on the European 
Commission and not the European Union per se. Unfortunately, the perception as implied in 
the chosen policy documents can only be determined from its analysed contents, according to 
the chosen research method. As the European Commission has changed three times since Arctic 
 
59 Offerdal (2011) p. 864 




policy inception, the results can merely indicate the change in perception and theoretical 
foundation as implied in official European Union Arctic policy, and not as the official 
standpoint of the entire European Union. Which is the reason for why the European 
Commission was chosen alongside limitations on the length and scope of this thesis. 
As the EU has become more engaged in issues surrounding the Arctic region, so has also the 
European Parliament after the Lisbon treaty, as it has been supportive of the main themes 
presented in the Arctic policy of the European Union.61 However, the institutional set-up of the 
EU only grants the parliament a supervisory role and as the Commission functions as the 
“legislative proposer”, it has been the most active in creating the European Union’s Arctic 
policy and performs as an agenda setter for the EU. Thus, it frames the Commissions stance as 
scientifically interesting to analyse. The three policy documents that were chosen likewise 
comprises the main European Union Arctic policy, and its gradual progression.62 
4.4. Operationalisation of research method  
In order to categorise the ideas in the empirical material, previously constructed model types 
were used. These are constructed and formed by the scholar who collects a number of typical 
features of a certain phenomenon based on previous research,63 which in this case is previous 
research and literature on International Politics concerning the theories of Liberalism and 
Realism. However, the method does not rely on the notion that there is an “perfect” model type, 
merely the most prominent characteristics of the “ideal type” is suitable when comparing it with 
the research material. This also implies that it should not be regarded as a neutral representation 
as the types are a product of the researchers own prejudices and interests. In order to bypass 
this problem, the author of this thesis has operationalised Mearsheimer’s three respective 
paradigms of Liberalism and Realism as presented in the theory section. By virtue of that the 
first step in an ideal analysis is to define the ideas or ideologies that will be scrutinized.64 These 
are most often found in previous research which in the case of this thesis has been literature 
regarding political theories. Subsequent of this, these have been classified after their most 
prominent characteristics, which have resulted in table 4.1.65 The characteristics where further 
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operationalised to function alongside European Union Arctic policy, and thus they have been 
constructed based on previous research, as well as theory.  
The main purpose of this was to identify and isolate the main aspects of the phenomenon 
relevant for the research problem which is the change in perception regarding security, 
governance and participation. The next step in the analysis was to measure the ideal types 
alongside the empirical material in order to determine on what level the material aligns with the 
model types. The empirical material that aligned itself with the theoretical paradigms was 
subsequently analysed. The theories were consequently sorted into tables that gives a 
dimensional position of the analysed policy. The dimensional analysis can use model types and 
is suitable in determining gradual ideological change, or a “change in ideas”.66 Which is why it 
was added to function beside the model types.  
The dimensions were placed on an opposite axis, which are the three specified research 
questions that scrutinised the material and these resulted in table 4.2.67 This was done in order 
to determine if the Commission had altered its perception of the Arctic as expressed in its 
policy. Table (4.1.) Functions as the analysis tool and table (4.2.) in order to answer previously 
produced research questions.  
The three generated research questions enabled the writer of this thesis to analyse the three main 
policy areas of the European Union’s Arctic policy, namely: sustainable development, 
multilateral cooperation and climate change. In turn, depending on how European Commission 
presents the solutions for these policy areas, these will likewise reflect how the region is 
perceived. The main policy areas also contain areas such as fisheries, investment and proposals 
for cooperation in the Arctic region. The research questions also identify ideas that are not 
contained in the main policy areas, such as how the Arctic is described in the meta text. This 
has enabled the writer of this thesis to analyse the entirety of the Arctic policy documents and 
not only the policy areas. By using quotes from the three policy documents that align themselves 
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4.5. Validity & Reliability  
Using model types brings structure to the analytical framework in an idea analysis as they 
present underlying patterns for the operator. The model type can subsequently be used to 
compare the research material, equally and against the model type. Furthermore, by applying 
dimensions, a progressive comparative analysis is achievable. Which is why the research 
method was chosen for this thesis. 
There are however some risks concerning the validity and reliability of the results by using 
these methods. A common problem is that the using investigator forces the model types on the 
material and as a result the material is not allowed “to speak for itself”.68 This most often 
depends on excessively constructed model types, and unfortunately this constitutes a problem 
if validity. There is also an issue of the researcher seeing model types in the material that might 
not be presented in the first place. In order to bypass this problem, the author of this thesis red 
the research material systematically and compared carefully chosen quotes with the previously 
constructed model types. These model types were based on theory from previous research, and 
they were subsequently operationalised twice to function alongside European Union Arctic 
policy with background to previous research on how Arctic politics functions. By 
operationalising the dimensions twice, it surpasses a research problem which often occurs in 
thesis’s, namely that of “blunt dimensions”. As such, the author of this thesis is under the firm 
belief that the conducted research has achieved validity.  
Reliability issues surrounding qualitative thesis’s mainly surrounds the replicability of the 
study, which naturally is more problematic. In order to bypass any reliability issues, during the 
progression of the thesis, the author has striven for intersubjectivity by being as open to the 
research material as possible. As such, the author of this thesis has also tried to display all 
methodological choices and operationalisations, alongside quotes in the results section. Thus, 
any reader can follow my analysis as well as the methodological progression of this thesis with 
background to previous research and theory. By virtue of this, the author of this thesis is under 
the firm belief that the conducted research has achieved reliability.  
 
 




4.6. Analysis instruments based on model types.  
Table, 4.1. Analysis tool based on model types. 
Model type Perception of Arctic 
governance 
Perception of Arctic 
Involvement 
Perception of Arctic security 
Realism. Unilateral 
States are the principal actors in 
Arctic relations and as the Arctic 
region is anarchic. The European 
Union shall as such only maintain 
relations with the most powerful 




There are diverging interest amongst 
Arctic stakeholders and as such 
cooperation is not preferable. The 
European Union shall strive to secure 
interests and natural resources in a self-
gaining manner. 
Anarchy 
There is a power struggle amongst 
Arctic nations over the resources 
confined in the region. As the region 
is characterised by confrontation, 
cooperation is unobtainable, or only to 
maintain a regional balance of power. 
The European Union is concerned 
over the power struggle in the region. 
Liberalism. Multilateral 
The political system of the Arctic is 
characterised by states, institutions 
and other stakeholders. The 
European Union shall seek to 
cooperate with all relevant Arctic 
actors in its Arctic policy. As the 
multilateral approach is seen as 
positive for regional governance. 
Interdependence 
There is a high level of interdependence 
between Arctic stakeholders. Mutual 
cooperation is perceived as positive by 
virtue of its peaceful impact on the 
Arctic region and for the beneficial 
impact of the resources confined in the 
region.  
Rule of law 
The Arctic region is characterised by 
the rule of law and peaceful 
cooperation between Arctic nations 
and regional stakeholders, as well as 
institutions. The European Union shall 
seek to maintain the Arctic according 
to the rule of law. 
 
Table, 4.2. Dimensional scale based on operationalised research questions. 
Dimensions COM (2008) COM (2012) COM (2016) Perception. 
Alignment with multilateral or 
unilateral governance. 
   Predominantly: 
Alignment with divergence or 
interdependence  
   Predominantly: 
Alignment with anarchy or with 
the rule of law. 




5. Results  
5.1. Perception of Arctic governance  
5.1.1. COM (2008) 
In “The European Union in the Arctic region”, the European Commission is concerned over 
the negative impacts that climate change will have on the Arctic region. Indigenous peoples are 
percieved as being of major concern as “About a third of the 4 million people living in the Arctic 
are indigenous. They are particularly vulnerable to the increasing pressures of climate change 
and globalisation.”69 
In order to solve the problems surrounding the Arctic region, the European Commission wants 
to strengthen regional cooperation and it acknowledges regional, international and NGO´s as 
important stakeholders in Arctic governance. By reason of this, the European commission 
wants to strengthen, assess, promote, and coordinate cooperation with Arctic stakeholders to 
tackle environmental concerns and support Arctic indigenous peoples. 
Rights of indigenous peoples are a thematic priority under the European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights.70 
By focusing on the rights for individual groups in the Arctic, the European Commission 
arguably perceives the Arctic from a liberal point of view. The Commission also recognises 
minor stakeholders alongside states as important components in future Arctic cooperation, 
which also implies a liberal perspective on Arctic governance. However, a major concern for 
the European Commission is the lack of efficiency of existing governance in the region that can 
solve any disputes that might arise. As such, it perceives current Arctic governance as futile; 
The main problems relating to Arctic governance include the fragmentation of the legal framework, 
the lack of effective instruments, the absence of an overall policy-setting process and gaps in 
participation, implementation and geographic scope.71 
This perception is interesting, as it observes multilateral cooperation as the most appropriate 
way to uphold Arctic effective governance in the region. 
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Yet, the Commission regards the current framework as fragmented and uncoordinated. In order 
to solve any future disputes and the fragmentation of legal framework, the Commission 
perceives strengthening of cooperative measures, and existing international framework as 
pivotal for ensuring that Arctic governance can function properly and as such “The EU should 
work to uphold the further development of a cooperative Arctic governance system based on 
the UNCLOS”.72 
An extensive international framework is already in place that also applies to the Arctic. The 
provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provide the basis for the 
settlement of disputes including delimitation. UNCLOS also contains rules for the use of living and 
non-living resources and the protection of the enviroment.73 
By adhering to the framework, the European Commission ensures that this would lead to 
security and stability, strict environmental management as well as a sustainable use of resources 
with open and equitable access in the Arctic.74 It also recognises the Arctic council as successful 
in developing a regional identity and setting agendas for its member states. By reason of this, 
the European Commission wants to apply for a permanent observer status role in the Arctic 
Council and further develop cross-border cooperation and regional programmes with Arctic 
states. 75  The Commission further maintains that regional and global cooperation is the 
appropriate method for Arctic governance. 
5.1.2. COM (2012) 
In the 2012 “Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 
2008”, The European Commission highlights the same issues regarding the Arctic region as in 
the 2008 communication. 
As climate change and economic development accelerate in the Arctic region, the European Union 
should step up its engagement with its Arctic partners to jointly meet the challenge of safeguarding 
the enviroment while ensuring the sustainable development of the Arctic region.76 
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Like the in 2008, the European Commission wants to solve these issues by engaging more with 
Arctic partners and solve any challenges that affect the region in collaboration with these. These 
partners constitute Arctic states, indigenous peoples, NGO´s and “other relevant stakeholders.” 
It also maintains that the UNCLOS is an important legal framework for operative Arctic 
governance.  
The EU intends to refine its developing Arctic policy in close cooperation with its Member States, 
the five non-EU Arctic states as well as local inhabitants, including indigenous peoples. Arctic states 
play a primary role in the region, both individually as well as in regional bodies. The EU 
acknowledges that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean, including the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other relevant international instruments, and 
considers UNCLOS as a key basis for the management of the Arctic ocean. It also recognises the 
remarkable international cooperation already established between Arctic states and within the 
different Arctic regional stakeholders.77 
However, some gradual change can be observed from the 2008 communication and it mainly 
surrounds the efficiency of pre-existing Arctic governance. Unlike in 2008, the 2012 
communication recognises “the remarkable international cooperation already established 
between Arctic states”. The Commission has also changed their perception of the Arctic 
Council as “The EU considers the Arctic Council to be the primary forum for international 
cooperation in the region”.78 Concisely, the communication also stresses that; 
The Commission and the High representative will moreover engage in a broad dialogue and 
consultation process with Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other relevant stakeholders. This 
will assist the EU in further refining its policy stance and ensure that the EU`s future contribution to 
the Arctic has the support of regional stakeholders and is supportive of the common actions of Arctic 
states.79 
Unlike in 2008, the European Union wants to engage with more legitimacy as in the previous 
communication it wanted to “strengthen, assess and coordinate” with Arctic stakeholders. In 
the 2012 Communication, it wants to “to step up its cooperation in Arctic matters in its bilateral 
dialogues with all its Arctic partners.”80 This presents a firmer liberal perspective on Arctic 
governance by virtue of the perception that existing intuitions, agreements and regional forums 
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function properly, and that the European Commission shall seek to further enhance such 
measures. Perhaps the most prominent case of this change in perception is the full recognition 
of the Arctic Council, in which all Arctic states participate alongside regional and global 
observers. 
5.1.3. COM (2016) 
In the 2016 Communication on “An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic, the 
European Commission is concerned over the higher profile in international relations that the 
Arctic region has come to possess due to climate change. In order to solve these problems, the 
Commission identifies a multilateral approach to be the most appropriate. 
While the Arctic states have the primary responsibility for tackling issues within their territories, 
many of the issues affecting the Arctic region that are discussed in this Joint Communication can be 
more effectively addressed through regional or multilateral cooperation. 81 
The Commission also highlights with whom and how this multilateral approach should be 
executed. Identical to previous communications, The European Commission is concerned over 
the protection and rights of Arctic indigenous peoples. As such, “The EU will continue to 
engage with Arctic indigenous peoples and local communities to ensure that their views and 
rights are respected and promoted in the ongoing development of EU policies affecting the 
Arctic.”82  
As in the 2008 and 2012 communications, the Commission also highlight the importance of the 
United Nations for promoting stability in the Arctic: “In particular, the UN Convention in the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides a framework for managing the Arctic ocean, including the 
peaceful settlement of disputes.”83  
The Commission also supports other UN initiatives such as the UN Economic Commission, 
UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Partners as well as the United Nations 
Environmental Programme. These initiatives are perceived as important participants in order to 
maintain Arctic cooperation, the rule of law and to reduce environmental concerns. The 
European Commission thus wants to take an active negotiating position in the UN regarding 
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Arctic matters.84 However, as in the 2012 Communication, the importance of the maintenance 
and cooperation with the Arctic council is perceived as the pivotal instrument for cooperation 
in the region. 
A number of Arctic cooperation forums have been set up in recent decades, the most important of 
which is the Arctic Council. The Arctic states have worked to foster peace and stability through 
cooperation and the application of the rule of law. Given the importance of the Arctic region and the 
significant changes underway there, it is important that the EU continues to cooperate with Arctic 
and non-Arctic partners to identify common positions and solutions on issues such as climate 
change, environmental protection and scientific research.85 
By virtue of this, the European Commission wants to “continue its active participation in the 
Arctic council – the primary forum for international cooperation in the region by, for example, 
participating in and contributing to the work of relevant working groups, task forces and expert 
groups”86 As indicated in the 2008 and 2012 Communications, the European Commission is 
under the impression the that a multilateral approach is the most appropriate in order to solve 
any Arctic governance issues. In turn, this should be done through the maintenance of 
international law and strengthened cooperation with all relevant Arctic stakeholders. These are 
according to the Commission the Arctic Council, its member states, indigenous peoples and 
other institutions with policies adjacent to Arctic issues such as the United Nations. 
5.2. Perception of Arctic involvement 
5.2.1. COM (2008) 
In the 2008 communication, the Commission do not perceive that there are diverging interests 
amongst Arctic stakeholders over the resources in the region. However, regarding its 
involvement over the economic assets therein, the Commission acknowledges that these are of 
great benefit for the European Union as a whole. The economic areas of interest are divided 
into several policy areas such as the sustainable extraction of natural resources and fisheries.  
The Arctic contains large untapped hydrocarbon reserves. Known Arctic offshore resources are 
located inside the Exclusive Economic Zone of Arctic states. Arctic resources could contribute to 
enhancing the EU’s security of supply concerning energy and raw materials in general. However, 
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exploitation will be slow since it presents great challenges and entails high costs due to harsh 
conditions and multiple environmental risks.87 
The Commission also state that “Support for the exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources 
should be provided in full respect of strict environmental standards considering the particular 
vulnerability of the Arctic.”88  It likewise maintain that it should “Work to strengthen the 
foundations for long-term cooperation, particularly with Norway and the Russian Federation, 
facilitating the sustainable and environmentally friendly exploration, extraction and 
transportation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources.” These statements emancipate an interesting 
perception from the European Commission. It does want to cooperate and promote the 
sustainable extraction of resources. However, “support” is an interesting choice of words. 
Similarly, is the notion of bilateral cooperation with Russia and Norway as these are important 
partners for the European Union regarding gas and oil. It implies that the Commission wants to 
engage in these matters in a self-gaining manner. The same can be seen regarding fisheries as 
the Commission is concerned over what the eventual migration of fish towards Arctic waters 
would result in, as the European Union is highly dependent on Arctic fish stock. 
New areas may become attractive for fishing with increased access due to reduced sea ice coverage. 
For some of the Arctic high seas waters there is not yet an international conversation or a 
management regime in place. This might lead to unregulated fisheries.89 
As with Arctic governance, the European Commission wants to solve this eventual predicament 
through multilateral cooperation within the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC) and Arctic states, as well as to maintain fishing at a sustainable level whilst respecting 
the rights of local coastal communities.90 
Put in place a regulatory framework for the part of the Arctic high seas not yet covered by an 
international conversation and management regime before new fishing opportunities arise. This will 
prevent fisheries developing in a regulatory vacuum. 
As such it is concerned over the regular supply of fish stock in a supervisory vacuum. 
Intuitively, it is concerned over sustainable fishing, but not as if it were a problem for all Arctic 
and adjacent nations, but as a problem of supply for the European Union itself. The European 
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Commission’s proposals for further investments in research likewise profess a perception that 
these should be done in a self-gaining manner.  
The European Community should maintain the Arctic as a priority area for research to close 
knowledge gaps and assess future anthropogenic impacts, especially in the area of climate change. 
Moreover, it should strengthen international cooperation and interoperability and contribute to 
designing concrete steps for prevention, mitigation and adaptation.91 
The perception as implied in this statement, acknowledges that research should be conducted 
within the field of climate change. However, at the same time the Commission proposes the 
following suggestions in its 2008 communication; “Promote further research and development 
in offshore technology and infrastructures. Build on experience accumulated in European 
Industry offshore oil and gas exploitation. Facilitate further research and innovation as 
emphasis shifts to even harsher climates and deeper waters.92 As well as that; “The EU edge 
in technologies for sustainable exploitation of resources in polar conditions should be 
maintained.”93  
As such, The European Union should ensure the protection of the Arctic enviroment, whilst at 
the same time conduct research within areas that could potentially harm it. As with the 
extraction of resources, research and fisheries, the Commission has the perception that it should 
strengthen its own capacity, with respect to environmental standards. “It is in the EU’s interests 
to explore and improve conditions for gradually introducing Arctic commercial navigation, 
while promoting stricter safety and environmental standards as well as avoiding detrimental 
effects.” 94  It also wants to “With the applicable rules of competition law, maintain the 
competitive lead of European shipyards in developing technology required for Arctic 
conditions. The potential to provide specially designed, enviroment-friendly ships, including 
icebreakers, is an important asset for the future.”95 
These implications make the Commissions perception regarding involvement in the Arctic 
region interesting as the focus have changed from multilateral cooperation and the benefit of 
 
91 COM (2008) p. 6 
92 COM (2008) p. 7 
93 COM (2008) p. 8 
94 COM (2008) p. 8 




all in terms of governance, to a more realist point of view when it concerns the economic assets 
confined in the region.  
5.2.2. COM (2012) 
As in the 2008 Communication, The European Commission do not perceive that there are any 
diverging interests over Arctic resources. However, unlike in 2008, the point of view has 
changed regarding how the extraction and procurement of these resources should proceed as 
more emphasis has been placed on cooperation. This implies that the Commission wants to 
make sure that its interests are aligned with all Arctic stakeholders, namely Arctic states as well 
as local communities. This change in perception applies to all areas with professed economic 
interests such as fisheries, the extraction of resources and research.  
The changing Arctic landscape is now opening up to new transport lanes and the exploitation of both 
natural and mineral resources. While this will be of benefit for the regional and global economy, it 
will also have repercussions on the Arctics fragile enviroment if not managed with utmost care. New 
technology and an extensive knowledge base will be required to ensure that economic opportunities 
do not come at the expense of the highest environmental standards and the preservation of the unique 
Arctic enviroment.96 
In the 2008 Communication, more emphasis was placed on the benefit of the European Union 
and less on the environmental repercussions of an arctic melt. In the 2012 communication 
however, emphasis is placed on mutual benefit, regional cooperation and sustainable execution 
regarding the extraction of natural resources. The professed perception that any extraction of 
Arctic assets should and will be done in a mutually benefiting manner implies that the 
Commission perceives that interdependence is the appropriate method for future economic 
matters and as such it aligns with a liberal model type. This is evident through its proposals for 
its future engagement;  
The Arctic states and the EU have a shared interest in ensuring that the Arctic`s natural resources 
both on land, at sea, and at or below the seabed are utilised in a sustainable manner that does not 
compromise the Arctic enviroment and benefits local communities.97 
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In view of increasing mining and oil extraction activities in the Arctic region, the EU will work with 
Arctic partners and the private sector to develop environmentally friendly, low-risk technologies 
that could be used by extractive industries.98 
The same change in perception can be seen regarding fisheries, which was professed as being 
of great concern for the European Union in the 2008 communication. Especially, concerns over 
the lack of a functioning framework that would ensure fair and transparent management of 
fisheries in case of a northward migration of fish-stock was acknowledged. In the 2012 
Communication, the Commission have no such concerns.  
One third of the fish caught in the Arctic are sold on the European market. Studies show that this 
figure could increase as fish stocks may move north as a result of warming seas. The EU is keen to 
ensure good cooperation with Arctic states in the sustainable management of marine biological 
resources.99 
Conclusively, this is also the case regarding the allocation of information, and the procurement 
and funding for research. In the 2008, Communication, weight was placed on the self-benefit 
of research regarding the Arctic as it would ensure European Union competitiveness. In the 
2012 Communication the Commission perceives scientific interdependence as something 
valuable. This is merely a reflection of a changed perception of how economic issues should be 
solved in the Arctic, as the Commission now regards interdependence as the appropriate method 
for solving economic dilemmas. This favours a policy which is more liberal in its theoretical 
stance concerning these issues. 
The EU will therefore seek broad cooperation with states that are active in the field of 
multidisciplinary Arctic research and in establishing research infrastructures. The alignment of 
Arctic research programmes will be an important contribution to knowledge and will increase the 
efficiency of research programmes while maximising their impact.100 
5.2.3. COM (2016) 
In the 2016 Communication on “An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic”, The 
European Commission does not perceive that there are diverging interests over Arctic 
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resources. However, a gradual change in perception can be observed yet again. Predominantly 
in the area of research, funding, and development as well as when it concerns fisheries. 
The EU should welcome the recent declaration signed by five Arctic coastal states on Arctic fisheries 
and the need to obtain more information on ecosystems in the Arctic ocean before opening up this 
region to commercial fishing. However, as the area concerned is beyond national jurisdiction, it will 
be necessary for all interested countries, not only the coastal states, to work together to establish the 
appropriate international measures. This framework should in due cource include a new Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisation or Arrangement, combined with a new Regional Sea 
Convention, to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of resources in the Arctic high 
seas.101 
This statement presents a noteworthy opinion. The existing regional framework has produced 
regulation regarding Arctic fisheries and the protection of local ecosystems. However, the 
Commission is under the opinion that it is an issue that should be solved multilaterally, and not 
bilaterally amongst Arctic coastal states. As no European Union member state has a direct 
shoreline with regional fishing waters, “The European Commission believes that such a 
framework can only be established in an open and inclusive manner and welcomes the 
broadening of the negotiations to involve major fishing nations” 102  By suggesting this 
approach, The European Commission maintains the interests of the European Union and its 
member states, whilst at the same time suggesting that cooperation in the matter should 
extended in order to have efficient regulation in place.  
Likewise, the change in perception regarding the extraction of natural resources is due to a more 
professed weight on the positive return of these in the “European Arctic region.” 
The European part of the Arctic also has significant potential to support growth in the rest of Europe. 
However, as the EU does not currently have a complete north-south traffic connection, it could 
explore the merits of strengthening links to the Arctic through trans-European networks, for example 
from Finland to Norway, providing access to the Arctic ocean.103  
Similarly, more emphasis on the European Arctic region can also be seen regarding future 
investment in the region. 
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Consultations by the Commission and the European External Action Service suggest that the 
European Arctic is suffering from underinvestment. Recognising the need to work closely with 
national, regional and local authorities in the European Arctic, the Commission will set up a 
European Arctic stakeholder forum with the aim of enhancing collaboration and coordination 
between different EU funding programmes.104 
This change in perception places more emphasis on the European Arctic region and less on the 
area’s entire extent. As such, future development and investment is arguably regarded as 
beneficial in a self-gaining manner for the European Union. By virtue of this, the Commission 
regards economic assets as way to strengthen its economic capacity and arguably its power. 
This provides evidence that the Commission yet again perceives the Arctic region from a more 
realist point of view. Similar thoughts can be seen regarding research; 
The EU should support the deployment of innovative technologies in the Arctic. These technologies 
could be applied to a wide range of activities such as the development of advanced materials capable 
of working in extreme conditions in the Arctic winter that could stimulate investments in energy 
efficiency and renewable energy solutions. Such technologies have the potential to bring broad 
social and economic benefits within and beyond the Arctic. In addition to Horizon 2020, the ESIF 
programmes provide funding for research and innovation activities in the European part of the 
Arctic.105 
While the Commission wants to engage sustainably in its extraction of resources, as these could 
encourage sustainable solutions, it wants to further develop these to function in the extreme 
weather conditions. As it has professed in the earlier communications, the harsh local 
enviroment has made the extraction of local assets difficult and thus it wants to strengthen its 
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5.3. Perception of Arctic security  
5.3.1. COM (2008) 
In the 2008 Communication “The European Union in the Arctic region”, The European 
Commission is concerned over the implications that climate change will have on the region and 
it perceives any severe alterations as a threat to European, as well as international stability. The 
geopolitical implications of climate change are perceived as a reason for creating the first steps 
for an Arctic policy of the European Union.  
In view of the role of climate change as a “threat” multiplier”, the Commission and the high 
representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy have pointed out that environmental 
changes are altering the geo-strategic dynamics of the Arctic with potential consequences for 
international stability and European Security interests calling for the development of an EU Arctic 
policy. On the whole, Arctic challenges and opportunities will have significant repercussions on the 
life of European citizens for generations to come. It is imperative for the European Union to address 
them in a coordinated and systematic manner, in cooperation with Arctic states, territories and other 
stakeholders.106 
While the European Commission is professing a will to solve these Arctic challenges with 
regional and international stakeholders, thus recognising the importance of cooperation, it is 
however concerned with existing Arctic governance. 
There is no specific treaty regime for the Arctic. No country or group of countries have sovereignty 
over the North Pole or the Arctic Ocean around it. There are several maritime borders where Arctic 
coastal states have not agreed upon the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones. Submissions 
to the UN Commission on the limits of the Continental Shelf may result in overlapping claims. 
Moreover, there are different interpretations of the conditions for passage of ships in some Arctic 
waters, especially in the Northwest Passage.107 
These statements indicate that the European Commission, while not explicitly claiming that 
there are security dilemmas in the Arctic region, perceives its stability as lacking and as such 
not according to the rule of law. Despite that the communication professes an intention and a 
will to strengthen regional cooperation, it is due to somewhat “anarchic” nature of present 
Arctic politics. Thus, that perception implies that the Commission has to address these issues 
with all relevant Arctic stakeholders. 
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5.3.2. COM (2012) 
In the 2012 Communication a change in perception can be observed. The security of the Arctic 
is perceived as efficient and according to existing international and regional framework. While 
the Communication does not provide an analysis over the security implications of climate 
change in the same amount as the 2008 Communication. It provides some insight; 
The Arctic is of growing strategic importance. It is an example of successful international 
cooperation contributing to peace and security in the region. The recent conclusion of the treaty 
between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and 
Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean is a positive example of such cooperation. 
Arctic states co-operate on the basis of existing international legal order, notably the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Seas. The Arctic Council is emerging as the leading regional body, in which all 
Arctic states, as well as indigenous peoples, are represented.108 
While the region is of growing strategic importance, the European Commission perceives that 
any concerns over the security implications of climate change (as expressed in the 2008 
Communication) can be solved through global and regional instances such as the UNCLOS, 
Arctic Council and through bilateral cooperation. Thus, the European Commission perceives 
that Arctic security functions according to the notion of rule of law based on the model type in 
the 2012 communication.  
5.3.3. COM (2016) 
The 2016 Communication expresses a perception of concern over the implications of climate 
change and what a future scenario might bring for local communities.  
While the changes affecting the Arctic present opportunities for local communities, they also have 
the potential to increase tensions in the region, for example through competition for resources and 
increasing economic activity. International legal frameworks, such as the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, also cover the Arctic. It is now more important than ever to ensure that the Arctic 
remains a zone of peace, prosperity and constructive international cooperation.109 
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While it suggests that these issues can be solved through multilateral governance, 
predominantly with the use the regulation confined within the UNCLOS, a change in perception 
can be observed.  
The challenges affecting the Arctic, and the solutions required to address them, require a joined-up 
response at regional and international level. Wider geopolitical dynamics may add further 
complexity to the changes affecting the region. The EU has a strong interest in seeing that the Arctic 
remains a zone of constructive international cooperation where complex issues are addressed 
through negotiated solutions, and where common platforms can be established in response to 
emerging risks.110 
The Commissions perception of Arctic security in the 2016 communication suggest that it yet 
again is concerned over how the region might function in the near future. Unlike the 2012 
Communication where these concerns where not expressed. The results indicate that the Arctic 
yet again is seen as somewhat anarchic, which ordains the 2016 Arctic policy with a realist 
perspective on Arctic security. It is also noteworthy that the Commission wants to ensure that 
effective stewardship of the Arctic ocean is in place, which arguably can be seen as a criticism 
of the Arctic council since the 2012 communication expressed that is “emerging as the leading 
regional body, in which all Arctic states, as well as indigenous peoples are represented.”111 
It is also important to ensure that appropriate measures are in place for effective stewardship of the 
Arctic ocean to ensure environmental protection, peaceful cooperation and dispute settlement, 
respect for international law and the sustainable use of marine resources. Maritime security is also 
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How does the Arctic policy align itself according to the perception that the Arctic is characterised 
by multilateral or unilateral governance? 
The first research question examined the perception of Arctic governance and the results 
indicate that the European Commission perceives a multilateral approach to the be the most 
appropriate in Arctic governance issues. It proposes that cooperation should be undertaken with 
all relevant Arctic stakeholders, which constitute the United Nations and its various instances, 
Arctic states, local and indigenous populations as well as the Arctic council. The latter was first 
recognised in the 2012 Communication, which presents evidence that Offerdals theory of the 
European Union altering its stance towards the Arctic to gain a permanent observer seat in the 
Arctic Council is correct.113 Ebinger & Zambetakis suggested that as the Arctic region is getting 
warmer, likewise will the European Union’s stance on its multilateral approach to the area 
change.114 However, there are not any indications that this perception has changed in the 
analysed material. The results predominantly align itself with Heininen’s research that suggests 
that Arctic cooperation is unique and resilient.115  
Regarding its position with the model types, and the gradual change of the Arctic policy, it 
follows a liberal perspective on Arctic governance. The European Commission is concerned 
over the implications of climate change, but it wants to sole these issues multilaterally and it 
maintains that perception progressively. Thus, it is also placed on the liberal perspective on the 
dimensional scale. 
How does the Arctic policy align itself according to the perception that the Arctic is 
characterised by divergence or interdependence in economic interests? 
The second research question focused on the perception of Arctic economic interests. While 
the European Commission do not perceive that there are any diverging interests amongst Arctic 
stakeholders over the natural resources that are confined in the region, the results present that 
it is interested in securing these in a self-gaining manner in the 2008 and 2016 communications. 
Arctic fish stock and natural assets are perceived as beneficial to the European Union and as 
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such it should seek to maintain these interests. Hossain116  and Østhagen117suggested that a 
major reason for the European Arctic policy in the first place was the interest Arctic recourses, 
and this perception is evident in all three of the Arctic policies respectively. The only difference 
is that it should either procure them in a self-benefiting manner, or for the benefit of all.  It is 
likewise noteworthy that the European Commission wants to enhance its technological 
capabilities through investment in the 2008, and 2016 Communications. By virtue of the lacking 
technological capabilities that can function in the harsh climate.  Ebinger and Zambetakis 
suggests, that the extraction of natural resources in the Arctic, and any subsequent race for those 
resources rely on the capacity of technological capabilities. In turn, when these are existent, the 
extraction and as subsequent “race for the Arctic” could be a possibility.118  
The 2012 communication on the other hand places emphasis on the mutual benefit of any Arctic 
recourses and thus it arguably strives for economic interdependence between all Arctic 
stakeholders. This makes the perception of any economic interests in the Arctic ambivalent and 
as such the dimensional progression somewhat uncoordinated. It can however be argued that 
the European Commission perceives Arctic assets from a predominantly realist perspective 
according to the model types. 
How does the Arctic policy objectives align itself according to the perception that 
Arctic security is defined by anarchy or the rule of law? 
The final research question analysed how the European Commission perceives the Arctic region 
with reference to security issues. Initially, the Commission perceived Arctic change as a threat 
to European as well as to International security and these concerns formed the foundation of 
the European Union’s Arctic policy. The 2012 communication acknowledges that the region is 
growing in strategic importance, but it maintains the perspective that it functions properly along 
existing framework and cooperation carried out by the Arctic Council and its various members. 
The 2016 communication marks a return to the impression that the geopolitical implications of 
climate change and its repercussions stresses regional cooperation as well as the establishment 
of effective stewardship for the region. 
 
116 Hossain (2015) p. 93 
117 Østhagen (2013) p. 75 




As was the case with the opinion of Arctic economic interests, the perception of Arctic security 
has changed in a similar manner. While the 2008 and 2016 policies perceive the region as 
anarchic, and as such according to a realist model type, the 2012 communication perceives the 
Arctic region in line the rule of law paradigm. This further provides evidence that Offerdal was 
right in her analysis, as she claims that the European Union changed its Arctic policy in order 
to gain a permanent observer status in the Arctic council, as some Arctic Council nations 
regarded the 2008 communication as problematic.119  Likewise, Hossain explains that as of yet 
the European Union has not been granted a permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. It 
acts as an “observer in principle” and this could be the reason for why it changed its perception 
as implied in its policy yet again.120 It could also be due to the importance of rhetoric’s when 
constructing policy, as Heininen state that depending on what one chose to call the region, so 
will also its adjacent policy reflect that stance.121  
Analysis table over the gradual dimensional change in perception. 
Table 4.2.  
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The main research question wanted to resolve if the European Commission perception of the 
Arctic predominantly corresponds with Liberalism or Realism, and in what way this perception 
had changed. A model type analysis with dimensions, alongside the theories of Liberalism and 
Realism was operationalised in order to answer the research question. The three main Arctic 
policies of the European Union were chosen and its three main policy areas, as well as their 
overall description of the Arctic was analysed.  
The results indicate that European Arctic policy has been ambivalent during its progression, 
and as such a firm point of opinion can not be established. However, it is predominantly liberal 
in its perception of the Arctic region, mainly regarding the notion of multilateral cooperation. 
In opposition, it is predominantly “realist” when it observes the Arctic region, as well as when 
it concerns its economic assets. Regarding change, it has only been observed when it concerns 
Arctic security and issues regarding these assets. That gradual change can be similarly observed 
in both areas during the same time period. The most obvious change was in the 2012 
communication when it stressed that economic interdependence was seen as something 
beneficial, and the rule of law as functioning. 
It proves that whilst the European Union like Østhagen suggests,122 functions on a normative 
foundation, it has realist perspectives when it perceives the Arctic region from the exterior. 
Further research can scrutinize if there is a difference in rhetoric’s and practice regarding 
European Union foreign policy as a whole. Further research can also scrutinise if the ever-
increasing climate in the Arctic region have resulted in more tensions between Arctic 
stakeholders. Perhaps more importantly, when the next European Arctic policy is published, 
based on the author of this thesis’s research, determine in which direction that policy ordains 
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Appendix 2.  
The gradual progression of the European Arctic policy.124 
1. European Parliament resolution, 9th of October 2008 - ‘Arctic governance’ 
2. Commission communication, 20th of November 2008 - ‘The EU and the Arctic region’ 
3. Council of the European Union, 8th of December 2008 - Arctic conclusions  
4. Council of the European Union, 8th of December 2009 - Arctic conclusions  
5. European Parliament resolution, 20th of January 2011 - ‘A Sustainable EU policy for the 
High North’ 
6. EEAS/Commission joint communication 26th of June 2012, with three documents: 
• ‘Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 
2008 and next steps’ (Official policy) 
• ‘The inventory of activities in the framework of developing a European Union 
Arctic Policy’ (Working paper) 
• ‘Space and the Arctic’ (Working paper) 
7. European Parliament resolution, 12th of March 2014 - ‘An EU strategy for the Arctic’ 
8. Council of the European Union, 12th of May 2014 - Arctic conclusions on ‘developing an 
EU policy towards the Arctic’. 
9. EEAS/Commission joint communication 27 April 2016 ‘An Integrated European Union 
Policy for the Arctic’ 
10. Council of the European Union, 20th of June 2016 - Arctic conclusions in response to the 
new Joint Communication 
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